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Abstract
Although static analysis is an important technique for detecting
buffer overﬂow before software deployment, current static tools
rely on considerable human effort for annotating code to help anal-
ysis, or for diagnosing warnings, many of which are false positives.
This paper presents an analysis technique that reﬁnes information
about thepathsthat involveapotential bufferoverﬂow tohelpinthe
diagnosis and debugging of vulnerabilities. Instead of only report-
ing a vulnerable buffer or statement in the program, which most
tools do, our analysis categorizes paths of a possibly vulnerable
statement into ﬁve types: Vulnerable, Overﬂow-User-Independent,
Safe, Infeasible and Don’t-Know. Thus, safe and infeasible paths
can be excluded from being inspected, providing focus on prob-
lematic paths. For scalability, we designed and implemented our
analysis as an interprocedural, demand-driven path-sensitive anal-
ysis. Our experiments demonstrate that various path types do go
through a possibly vulnerable buffer statement. The results also in-
dicate that our technique is efﬁcient and practical.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.2.4 [Software Engineer-
ing]: Software/Program Veriﬁcation; D.2.5 [Software Engineer-
ing]: Testing and Debugging
General Terms Algorithms, Reliability, Security, Veriﬁcation
Keywords Path-Sensitive, Demand-Driven, Infeasible Paths
1. Introduction
Although much effort has been expended to detect and avoid buffer
overﬂow in software, we are still plagued with exploits that are
costly to ﬁx, disruptive, and promote a general loss of trust in soft-
ware. Since many applications are written in unsafe languages and
it is difﬁcult for programmers to correctly write applications that
use buffers, buffer overﬂow is still being introduced into software
and is the most commonly exploited vulnerability [5, 21]. In 2006,
SecuriTeam reported 134 vulnerable overﬂows, a quarter of the to-
tal security warnings [21], and many of them have caused severe
impact such as unauthorized access and denial of service. To detect
vulnerabilities, dynamic detectors are used but they slow down the
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execution by a factor of 2 to 30 due to the increase of code size,
branch mispredictions and data cache misses [24]. Therefore dy-
namic buffer overﬂow detection is difﬁcult to apply for time con-
strained software. In addition, patches to ﬁx the vulnerability are
expensive due to the number of computers typically effected. For
these reasons, a number of software companies rely on static anal-
ysis to detect buffer overﬂow before software release [12, 13].
However, current static tools require considerable human ef-
fort, either for diagnosing warnings or for annotating programs to
help analysis [4, 11, 13, 18, 22, 24]. Many tools report warnings
about potentially vulnerable program points, such as statements or
buffers, for example, Splint, BOON and ARCHER [11, 22, 24].
The code reviewer has no knowledge about the paths through the
program point that actually produce the vulnerability. Tools that re-
port vulnerable paths instead of statements include Preﬁx, ESPx
and Prefast [4, 13, 18]. The analysis is performed exhaustively
along all program paths. The challenge for these tools is scalability,
in particular when the vulnerability may cross procedure bound-
aries. Asa result, the tools sometime have togive up after exploring
a certain number of paths [18]. Although heuristics can be applied
to select and merge paths, excessive warnings are produced [4].
Some tools address scalability by introducing annotations to spec-
ify the buffer contract between procedures and thus turn the buffer
overﬂow detection intraprocedural [13]. But both writing and ver-
iﬁcation of annotations are costly, and thus, correctness of annota-
tions is not guaranteed.
This paper presents an interprocedural demand-driven path-
sensitive analysis with the goal of reducing the effort required to
identify program paths that are vulnerable and providing more pre-
cise information about the vulnerability to help users ﬁnd the root
cause. Our analysis classiﬁes paths as infeasible, safe, vulnerable
with potential for exploits, overﬂow with little chance to be ex-
ploited, and don’t-know. Our analysis is driven by statements that
have a deﬁnition or redeﬁnition of a buffer. By using a demand-
driven algorithm, our analysis is directed to those paths that can
be executed and maybe vulnerable, and the analysis terminates as
soon as the vulnerability decision is discovered. Through our anal-
ysis, we exclude paths that are infeasible and safe, and prioritize
paths that can overﬂow based on their chance of being exploited.
In summary, the contributions of the paper include:
1. A categorization and identiﬁcation of ﬁve types of paths for
buffer overﬂow.
2. Aninterprocedural demand-driven path-sensitive diagnosis tool
for identifying the types of paths through a potential overﬂow
buffer.
3. Experimental results that demonstrate the path types existing in
real programs and the time and space costs of the analysis.
63Figure 1. A Simple Example
Section 2 gives an overview of our approach using a simple
example. Section 3 deﬁnes ﬁve path types. Section 4 describes
the demand-driven model and framework. Experimental results are
given in Section 5, followed by the related work in Section 6, and a
summary in Section 7.
2. Overview and an Example
We present an overview of our technique through an example in
Figure 1 that is based on the work of Bodik et al [3]. In the
discussion of the example, we assume that a demand-driven path-
sensitive infeasibility analysis has already been done [3].
In Figure 1, nodes 3, 4, 8, 12 and 14 write strings to a buffer.
Overﬂow might occur at any of these ﬁve nodes. The nodes 3 and
4 are identiﬁed to be safe buffer deﬁnitions since both the buffer
size and the content of the buffer can be determined locally. For the
nodes 8, 12 and 14, we need more context to make a judgment as
to their vulnerability.
Consider the buffer at node 12, which is a string copy. We ﬁrst
construct and raise the query BSize(b) > TPos(a) at node 12,
which means after the strcpy, if the size of buffer b, BSize(b),
is larger than the index of the null string terminator in the buffer,
TPos(a),thebuffer accessissafe(weassumetheindexstartsat 0).
The query is then propagated backwards to the nodes 11 and then 9.
No information is collected at these two nodes to update the query
as they have no impact on the query. At each step of propagation,
we cache the query at the node for reuse. At node 9, we propagate
the query along three paths to its predecessors, namely nodes 16, 8
and 5. At node 16, the query enters a loop, which does not update
the query. Thus the query is merged at node 9 and not propagated
further. The query from node 8 reaches an infeasible path segment,
h8,9,11,12i,and terminates. Fromnode 5, thequery ispropagated
to node 4. Here, it is discovered that TPos(a) = 3, and the query
1 void ftpBuildTitleUrl ( FtpStateData ∗ftpState ){
2 request t ∗request = ftpState− >request ;
3 si z e t len ;
4 char ∗t ;
5 len = 64
6 + st rl en ( ftpState− >user )
7 + st rl en ( ftpState− >password)
8 + st rl en ( request− >host )
9 + st rl en ( request− >urlpath );
10 . . .
11 t = xcalloc ( len , 1);
12 s t rc a t ( t , ” ftp : / / ” );
13 if ( strcmp ( ftpState− >user , ”anonymous” )) {
14 st r ca t ( t , rfc1738 escape part (
15 ftpState− >user )) ;
16 i f ( ftpState− >password url ) {
17 s t rc a t ( t , ” : ” );
18 s t rc a t ( t , rfc1738 escape part (
19 ftpState− >password )) ;
20 }
21 st r ca t ( t , ”@” );
22 }
23 s t rc a t ( t , request− >host );
24 . . .
25 }
Figure 2. Code Snippet from Squid-2.3 ftp.c.
is updated to BSize(b) > 3. Meanwhile, a ﬂag is set in the query
to indicate the buffer content currently is constant. The propagation
continues and the information at node 3 indicates BSize(b) = 2.
Thus the query is resolved by 2 > 3 as false. The constant ﬂag
shows the buffer is overﬂowed by some constant string and is not
dependent oninput. Notethatpropagation haltsassoonasthequery
is resolved. We propagate this answer to the nodes we have visited
to determine the path.
3. Path Types
In this section, we describe the types of paths that we identify.
We consider both feasibility and buffer overﬂow in the classiﬁ-
cation. Our goals for categorizing paths include: 1) distinguishing
faulty paths from safe and infeasible paths, 2) prioritizing vulner-
able paths based on their possible exploitation consequences, and
3) identifying what paths should be further explored to determine
itsvulnerability. Wenow classifypathsthatgothrough apotentially
vulnerable statement, PVS.
Infeasible: Infeasible paths can never be executed. Therefore,
the overﬂow property of buffers on those paths is meaningless for
judging whether or not a buffer overﬂow exists. Infeasible paths
occur when there exist branch correlations along a path that make
a branch unexecutable. Previous work shows that there are 9–40%
statically detectable branch correlations [2], which indicates that
it is necessary to try to identify them. However, identifying all
infeasible paths is not computable [1].
Safe: Given a PVS, some paths that execute the PVS are safe
either because the bounds checking is properly done along the
path or the overﬂow will not happen under any input that leads to
traversal of these paths. For example, in Figure 2, code from Squid-
2.3 ftp.c shows that the path h1 − 13,23i is always safe regardless
of a possibly vulnerable strcat at the line 23.
Vulnerable: Many attacks through buffer overﬂow are con-
ducted through external inputs, e.g., command line, ﬁle, network
packets or environment variables. Attack incidents show that im-
portant attack data such as control transfer code in the control-
data attack and data used to corrupt program variables in the non-
control-data attack [7] are usually injected through the overﬂowed
buffer [5, 21]. The data such as malicious payload for stack smash-
ing [19] or parameters for system calls to launch return-into-lib at-
tack [23] are also often located in the overﬂowed buffer [5, 21].
Therefore we consider a buffer that can overﬂow with user input
as a likely exploitable buffer. If feasible paths reach these types
of buffer, we call them vulnerable paths. In Figure 1, the path
64h1 − 6,18,19,7,8i is considered vulnerable if str gets a string
from the user input.
Overﬂow-User-Independent: Not all buffer overﬂows are ex-
ploitable byunknown users, e.g., when thebuffer can overﬂow only
with constants in the program, the chance of exploitation is low
compared to a buffer overﬂowed through external input. A crash
or corruption of the data could still be possible. Paths containing
these buffers are placed in a lower priority than vulnerable paths.
This prioritization is useful when the message volume is large and
there is a time limit imposed for correcting the code. In a large code
base, it is impossible to ﬁx every bug before releasing the software.
h1 − 5,9,11,12i in Figure 1 is an overﬂow-user-independent path.
It can overﬂow the buffer b with the C string "y" (the character ’y’
followed by the null terminator ’\0’).
Don’t-Know: We identify paths as don’t-know when their de-
tection is beyond the power of static analysis, e.g., the library
source will not be known until link time. Instead of merging im-
precise dataﬂow facts with precise facts and generating conser-
vative results, we identify those don’t-know paths and the rea-
son that makes them don’t-know so that a code reviewer is aware
of them and other detection facilities such as testing can be ap-
plied. In Figure 2, paths entering the if statement at line 13, such
as h1 − 23i, encounter the library call rfc1738 escape part
at line 14 or line 18, which may deﬁne ftpState->user and
ftpState->password. Thus the content written to the buffer t
cannot be judged by the static analyzer.
4. Buffer Overﬂow Analysis
A demand-driven analysis has a number of advantages that lead to
scalability. Firstly, each query of a PVS is independent and thus
all queries can be performed in parallel. The intermediate queries
generated for solving a query can be cached and reused for check-
ing queries from other buffers. Also, the analysis only visits the
nodes reachable from the PVS, collects information related to user
queries, and terminates as soon as the query is resolved. Experi-
ments on a demand-driven copy constant propagation framework
reported the speedup of a factor of 1.4–44.3 for a set of bench-
marks [10]. A demand-driven approach also provides a user with
ﬂexibilityfordiagnosing anddebugging errorswithregardtowhich
buffer should be checked.
Our analysis for buffer overﬂows instantiates and extends a
general demand-driven framework based on Duesterwald et al’s
work [10]. The demand-driven approach has showed scalability
for solving dataﬂow problems such as reaching deﬁnition and con-
stant propagation [10]. However, according to our knowledge, it
has not been investigated for detecting software errors or vulner-
abilities. According to Duesterwald et al [10], in order to build a
concrete demand-driven analyzer, we should answer the following
questions: 1) What is the query and where is it raised? 2) How
should the query be propagated? 3) What information is used for
updating queries? 4) With the information, what are the updating
rules for queries? 5) When is the search terminated?
4.1 The Demand-Driven Model
For designing a buffer overﬂow demand-driven analyzer, we de-
velop a demand-driven model using the above questions as a guide.
Some descriptions below are language dependent and we use C and
C++ for explanation.
Query. We deﬁne a set of program points of interest as PVSs
where queries are raised. Conservatively, we assume that every
deﬁnition to a buffer (write to a buffer) is dangerous, thus is a PVS.
A buffer overﬂow query is regarding whether a buffer access at
the PVS would be safe and whether the user input could write to
the buffer. These two parts are represented as a constraint of buffer
size and string length, and a ﬂag in the query. We designed a set
of query templates for PVSs. The second column of Table 1 shows
some example constraints for the selected PVSs.
Information for Updating Queries. There is a set of program
points where information could be extracted to update queries.
They include buffer deﬁnitions, buffer allocations, index deﬁni-
tions, alias operations and pointer arithmetic. Buffer deﬁnitions are
PVSs, as we explained above. Buffer allocations often specify the
size of a buffer. For example, stack buffer can be declared as char
a[10], and the heap buffer is usually allocated by the malloc fam-
ily of library calls. The information also can come from constant
assignment, branch conditions and the declared type. The extracted
information is formatted as assertions so that the analysis can use
substitution or inequality rules to update queries. The third column
of Table 1 showed some assertions formatted from the node of the
buffer deﬁnition and allocation.
Propagation Rules. Based on the work of Bodik and Duester-
wald et al [2, 3, 10], we designed rules for propagating queries
interprocedurally, incorporating feasibility, and handling loops.
We only propagate queries interprocedurally when we are con-
ﬁdent that this call will update the query. To determine if a pro-
cedure impacts a query, we ﬁrst check if any unknown variables
in the query constraint deﬁned by a global, a return or reference
parameters of the call. If so, we perform a simple linear scan to de-
termine if a statement in the procedure can possibly update a query.
Our analysis is context sensitive. Therefore the query will be prop-
agated back to the call site after it propagates out of the procedure.
Only a newly raised query will be propagated to all call sites of its
raised procedure.
In order to make sure a query is not propagated along an infea-
sible path, we ﬁrst detect infeasible paths using branch correlation
and mark infeasible path segments on the edges of an Interproce-
dural Control Flow Graph (ICFG) [3, 14]. During buffer overﬂow
analysis, the query terminates when it encounters an infeasible path
segment.
We also developed propagation rules for loops. In our analysis,
users can specify the number of iterations they would like to com-
pute for the loop. We track the query precisely when the iteration
of the loop has not reached the threshold. Sometimes, the query can
only be updated during the ﬁrst iteration of the loop or even cannot
be updated in the loop. In this case, queries from different iterations
aremerged. Sometimes, loop iterationisbounded by some constant
integer, e.g., the loop for (int i = 0; i < 100; i++) will it-
erate 100 times. When this type of loop is detected, we compute
the ﬁnal query with the upper limit of loop iteration. There are also
loops whose iterations are not regular and might be determined by
the user input. We represent the query after these loops as unknown
in terms of loop iterations, and continuously propagate the query to
see if any user input can control this loop to overﬂow the buffer.
Resolving theQuery.For buffer overﬂow detection, thegeneral
property we aim to check is: after a write to the buffer, the declared
buffer size must be no less than the size of the string stored in the
buffer. It should be noted that we only specify the upper limit of the
buffer and for the buffer write overﬂow. But the technique can be
easily extended to also include the lower bound and read overﬂow.
Based on the general property, we further expand the overﬂow
properties to be vulnerable, overﬂow-user-independent, safe and
don’t-know, each of which corresponds to a path type deﬁned in
Section 3. During the analysis, if the information collected in the
query is enough to be evaluated as one of the above properties, the
query is solved.
4.2 The Framework
Figure 3 presents the framework for the buffer overﬂow analyzer.
Our goal is to compute types of paths we deﬁned in Section 3. The
demand-driven model in the previous section guides the analysis to
65Code Constraints Assertions
strcpy(a,b) BSize(a) > TPos(b) TPos0(a) = TPos(b)
strcat(a,b) BSize(a) > TPos(a) + TPos(b) TPos0(a) = TPos(b) + TPos(a)
strncpy(a,b,n) BSize(a) > Min(TPos(b),n) (TPos0(a) = ∞&&TPos(b) >= n) k
(TPos0(a) = TPos(b)&&TPos(b) < n)
a[i] = ’t’ BSize(a) > i TPos0(a) = ∞
char a[x] N/A L(a) = x
char *a = (char*)malloc(x) N/A L(a) = x/8
Table 1. Examples of Buffer Overﬂow Constraints and Assertions for C (TPos(x): index of the null terminator in buffer x; TPos0(x): index of the null
terminator after the buffer deﬁnition; Min(x,y): minimum value among x and y; BSize(x): buffer size of x)
Figure 3. Framework for Buffer Overﬂow Analysis
identify a PVS, raise and solve the query with the proper informa-
tion abstracted from source code. As the ﬁrst step, the analysis de-
tects infeasible paths and mark them on the ICFG. Second, a PVS
is identiﬁed and a query is raised at this PVS. Then the query is
propagated backwards under a set of propagation rules, and when
it reaches a node, the information is collected to update the query.
Every time a query is updated, the analysis judges if the query is
solved to be one of the overﬂow properties. If not, the query will
be continuously propagated. This process continues iteratively un-
til the query is solved. After all queries are solved, the results are
propagated from solved nodes to all previously visited nodes, and
the path types arelabeled on theedge. Wecan then identify the path
based on the edge markings.
5. Experimentation
To investigate the existence of the ﬁve types of paths in the real
programs, weimplementedour demand-driven algorithmusingMi-
crosoft Phoenix APIs [17]. We measured the cost of the analysis on
a set of benchmark programs selected from the BugBench [15] and
the Buffer Overﬂow Benchmark [25]. The set consists of 9 pro-
grams, each of which contains known buffer overﬂow. Our exper-
iments compute buffer overﬂow paths for these known vulnerabil-
ities, identify the type of path, and determine the performance and
space usage of analysis.
In our experiments, we compute buffer overﬂow paths for one
PVS in each program. We would check every PVS of the program
to make sure the software is secure. Our experiments consist of two
steps. In the ﬁrst step, we compute paths for a PVS in a benchmark
program without considering infeasibility of paths. We then inte-
grate our infeasibility detection module to check the impact of the
infeasible paths on the query. In Tables 2, 3 and 4, we use a prime
(
0) symbol for results after integrating infeasible paths.
We summarize the generated paths for benchmarks including
path types and path segment lengths in Table 2. The path segment
consists of all nodes between when the query was raised and when
it was resolved. Under the Path Types column, there are vulner-
able (Vul), overﬂow-user-independent (CNST), don’t-know (UnK)
and safe (Safe) subcolumns. Each subcolumn lists the number of
the path generated for the speciﬁed type. The results show that
all ﬁve types of paths do exist in real programs. Six of nine pro-
grams are detected to have vulnerable paths, and two programs
have don’t-know paths due to an external library. One program
contains overﬂow-user-independent paths. Seven out of nine pro-
grams have safe paths. Without our path detection, the code de-
buggers might explore safe paths which will not be successful in
ﬁnding the vulnerability. For the program bc-1.06, the total num-
ber of overﬂow-user-independent paths is very large and we ran
out of memory when we traversed the marked ICFG to print paths.
Actually, the number of paths is not important because it is not nec-
essary for a code reviewer to inspect every path for diagnosis. With
our framework, users can specify the number of paths to be output.
After ﬁxing them, the framework would be used again to determine
if this ﬁx corrects all vulnerable paths of the PVS.
The column, Inf, under Path Types shows whether infeasible
paths are detected in the programs [3]. We identify that six out of
nine programs have infeasible paths. Using the infeasible informa-
tion, the number of safe paths in three programs and the number of
unknown paths in one program are able to be reduced. The length
of the path segments is given by the number of different procedures
(not including library calls) and number of basic blocks that are tra-
versed by the path. These numbers are shown in the Average Path
Size column.
In Table 3, we present data to evaluate the demand-driven ap-
proach. Under the Basic Blocks column, subcolumn All Blocks re-
ports the total number of basic blocks in the program. The column
labeled V Blocks reports the number of visited blocks during the
analysis. Similarly, the All Procs column lists the total number of
non-library procedures. V Procs lists the number of procedure vis-
ited. There are two worklists which are representative to report the
memory usage of the analysis. Max S shows the maximum num-
ber of elements in the worklist during the solve-query step while
Max P gives the maximum number of elements in the worklist dur-
ing the propagate-results step. With theinfeasible paths integration,
the number of visited blocks and procedures is usually reduced be-
cause blocks that are on the infeasible paths are no longer visited.
Thetotal number of elements in theworklist of the solve-query step
often increases because, in the presence of infeasible information,
queries are less likely merged.
Table 4 shows the time of our analysis. Performance is reported
by Phoenix’s time report functionality [17]. For the nine programs,
the performance varies from .24 to 102.6 seconds for detecting
infeasible paths and resolving a buffer overﬂow query along all
paths. Thememoryusage ranges from9to65MB andtheaverageis
18MB. We also report the memory usage by the size of the worklist
queue (see Table 3 column Work List).
The above results demonstrate that the path types we deﬁned
all exist in the real code. For the vulnerable paths we generated,
many cross procedural boundaries, involve global buffers, or are
located in loops. Without the identiﬁcation of the actual paths,
these features will make manual inspection very difﬁcult and time-
consuming.
66Benchmark Lines Path Types Average Path Size
of Code Inf Vul/Vul0 CNST/CNST0 UnK/UnK0 Safe/Safe0 # P/#P0 # B/#B0
polymorph-0.4.0 0.7K yes 966/966 0/0 0/0 434/0 2.6/2.5 26.1/25.9
ncompress-4.2.4 1.9K yes 288/288 0/0 0/0 2016/0 2.0/2.0 29.3/27.8
man-1.5h1 4.7K yes 16/16 0/0 0/0 24/24 1.8/1.8 14.3/14.3
gzip-1.2.4 8.2K no 1/1 0/0 0/0 0/0 3/3 5/5
bc-1.06 17.0K yes 0/0 >50,000/>50,000 0/0 >30,000/>30,000 - -
squid-2.3 93.5K yes 0/0 0/0 8/4 4/2 1/1 6.7/6.8
wu-ftp: mapping-chdir 0.4K yes 4320/4320 0/0 0/0 18624/18624 3.8/3.8 33.6/33.6
sendmail: ge-bad 0.7K no 48/48 0/0 0/0 648/648 2.0/2.0 35.5/35.5
BIND: nxt-bad 1.3K no 0/0 0/0 2/2 0/0 2.0/2.0 23.5/23.5
Table 2. Experiment Results: Computed Paths for Benchmarks
Benchmark Basic Blocks Procedures Work List
All Blocks V Blocks/V Blocks0 All Procs V Procs/V Procs0 Max S/Max S0 Max P/Max P0
polymorph-0.4.0 740 34/34 22 3/3 10/9 13/13
ncompress-4.2.4 654 48/47 14 2/2 12/12 16/15
man-1.5h1 2593 100/100 78 8/8 23/23 25/25
gzip-1.2.4 3436 5/5 102 3/3 2/2 2/2
bc-1.06 3090 228/226 102 12/11 102/115 54/50
squid-2.3 35189 10/10 1423 1/1 5/4 3/3
wu-ftp:mapping chdir 129 40/39 6 4/3 46/46 10/10
sendmail: ge-bad 187 34/34 8 3/3 6/7 5/5
BIND: nxt-bad 423 31/31 14 2/2 8/8 6/6
Table 3. Evaluating Demand-Driven Analysis
Benchmark Time(s) Time0(s)
polymorph-0.4.0 12.19 12.40
ncompress-4.2.4 0.69 0.24
man-1.5h1 2.05 2.16
gzip-1.2.4 0.24 0.24
bc-1.06 98.3 102.6
squid-2.3 1.14 1.32
wu-ftp:mapping chdir 13.51 13.36
sendmail: ge-bad 1.64 1.70
BIND: nxt-bad 2.40 2.65
Table 4. Performance of Analysis
6. Related Work
Many approaches for detecting buffer overﬂow have been pro-
posed, including compilers, languages, dynamic detectors and
static analysis. Static analysis has the advantage that the overﬂow
can be detected and ﬁxed before software release. The drawbacks
include high false positive rates and required human efforts for
conﬁrmation, prioritizationand diagnoses of the bug. General static
approaches include mapping of buffer bounds checking to integer
range analysis, abstract interpretation, symbolic execution or type
inference [11, 13, 22, 24]. Most of the existing static tools report
high false positives, require annotations, or do not report or char-
acterize paths.
Path-sensitive analysis aims to check if the property holds for
every path. It reduces false positives by excluding infeasible paths.
ARCHER [24] is path-sensitive, but it does not compute faulty
paths, and only reports statements where the access of the buffer
is violated. ESP [8] generates a set of paths where typestate vio-
lation can occur. MOPS [6] adapts model checking technology for
computing a set of traces that violate security properties.
Demand-driven analysis aims to reduce time and space over-
head by only collecting information that is needed, and thus im-
proving scalability [10]. Duesterwald et al. designed a general
framework for interprocedural dataﬂow analysis [10], which has
been used to infeasible path detection and dataﬂow testing [3, 9].
Demand-driven analysis has also been applied to reproduce traces
to explain program failure caused by typestate errors and to detect
memory leaks [16, 20].
7. Conclusions and Future Work
This paper presents a demand-driven path-sensitive analysis frame-
work for detecting and categorizing paths along which a buffer
overﬂow may occur. The analysis is ﬂexible, scalable and fully au-
tomatic. Its major contributions are:
• Reducing false positives by eliminating infeasible and safe
paths that go through a vulnerable statement.
• Providing information on paths with overﬂow for directing
manual diagnosis.
• Categorizing paths based on their chance of being exploited.
In the future, we plan to more fully explore the usage of the
information provided by our technique in ﬁnding and correcting
bugs. We also plan to use more sophisticated constraint solvers and
alias detectors to provide more precise categorization.
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